Essays of warren buffet (before Common stock)
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The year 2015 marks the fiftieth anniversary of Berkshire Hathaway under
Warren Buffett's leadership, a milestone worth commemorating. The tenure
sets a record for chief executive not only in duration but in value creation
and philosophizing. This fourth edition of The Essays of Warren Buffett:
Lessons for Corporate America celebrates its twentieth anniversary. As the
book Buffett autographs most, its popularity and longevity attest to the
widespread appetite for this unique compilation of Buffett's thoughts that is
at once comprehensive, non-repetitive, and digestible.
The original edition of The Essays of Warren Buffett was the centerpiece
of a symposium held two decades ago at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School
of Law under the auspices of its Heyman Center on Corporate Governance.
This gathering brought hundreds of students together for a two-day
dissection of all the ideas in the compilation, featuring a series of vibrant
debates among some 30 distinguished professors, investors, and managers,
with Warren and Charles T. Munger, Berkshire's vice chairman,
participating throughout from their seats in the front row.
In the two decades since initial publication, I have often taught The
Essays , as this book has come to be known, in my classes and seminars at
four different universities. The book is adopted by scores of professors at
other schools for classes such as investment, finance and accounting.
Investment firms have distributed copies to their professional employees
and clients as part of training programs. I am grateful for the positive
feedback from these students, teachers, and other users and delighted to
know that the lessons are being taught.
As in previous editions of The Essays , this one retains the architecture
and philosophy of the original edition but adds selections from Warren's
most recent annual shareholder letters, including his fiftieth anniversary
retrospective. All the letters are woven together into a fabric that reads as a
complete and coherent narrative of a sound business and investment
philosophy. As an aid to all readers, and to enable readers of the previous
editions to see what is new in this one, a disposition table at the end of the
book shows the various places in this collection where selections from each
year's letter appear. Footnotes throughout indicate the year of the annual
report from which essays are taken. To avoid interrupting the narrative
flow, omissions of text within excerpts are not indicated by ellipses or other
punctuation.
The new edition is called for not because anything has changed about the
fundamentals of Warren's sound business and investment philosophy but
because articulation of that philosophy is always delivered in the context of
contemporary events and business conditions. So periodic updating is
warranted to maintain its currency.
In preparing the previous editions, I was aided by numerous people, to
whom I expressed gratitude in those editions, and I want to thank them
again. Among those, I especially thank Warren Buffett. His generosity not
only made the symposium possible but his participation enriched it
manifold; his willingness to entrust the rearrangement and ongoing
republication of his letters to me is a great honor. His partner, Charlie
Munger, deserves explicit repeated thanks too, for not only did he
participate in the 1996 symposium from the front row he also graciously
chaired, on a moment's notice, one of the panels. He also granted me
permission to reprint some of his letters in this collection as well, including
his fiftieth anniversary retrospective.
At Berkshire's 2011 annual meeting, Charlie stressed to me how different
Berkshire had become in the fifteen years since our symposium—and yet
how much it remained the same. Back then, Berkshire looked more like a
mutual fund, with 80 percent of its assets in minority common stock
positions and 20 percent in wholly owned businesses; today, the ratio is
reversed and Berkshire looks more like a conglomerate. Yet then and now,
the company and its constituents are united by a core set of common
values, values defined by the tone Warren set at the top and that animate
The Essays . I thank the many thousands of devoted fans, followers, and
friends who have been avid readers of The Essays over the past 20 years
and look forward to continuing our journey.
Lawrence A. Cunningham
New York City
Experienced readers of Warren Buffett's letters to the shareholders of
Berkshire Hathaway Inc. have gained an enormously valuable informal
education. The letters distill in plain words all the basic principles of sound
business practices. On selecting managers and investments, valuing
businesses, and using financial information profitably, the writings are
broad in scope, and long on wisdom. By arranging these writings as
thematic essays, this collection presents a synthesis of the overall business
and investment philosophy intended for dissemination to a wide general
audience.
The central theme uniting Buffett's lucid essays is that the principles of
fundamental business analysis, first formulated by his teachers Ben
Graham and David Dodd, should guide investment practice. Linked to that
theme are management principles that define the proper role of corporate
managers as the stewards of invested capital, and the proper role of
shareholders as the suppliers and owners of capital. Radiating from these
main themes are practical and sensible lessons on the entire range of
important business issues, from accounting to mergers to valuation.
Buffett has applied these traditional principles as chief executive officer
of Berkshire Hathaway, a company with roots in a group of textile
operations begun in the early 1800s. Buffett took the helm of Berkshire in
1965, when its book value per share was $19.46 and its intrinsic value per
share far lower. Today, its book value per share is around $100,000 and its
intrinsic value far higher. The growth rate in book value per share during
that period is about 20% compounded annually.
Berkshire is now a holding company engaged in 80 distinct business
lines. Berkshire's most important business is insurance, carried on through
various companies including its 100% owned subsidiary, GEICO
Corporation, among the largest auto insurers in the United States, and
General Re Corporation, one of the largest reinsurers in the world. In 2010,
Berkshire acquired Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company,
among the largest railroads in North America, and has long owned and
operated large energy companies.
Some Berkshire subsidiaries are massive: ten would be included in the
Fortune 500 if they were stand-alone companies. Its other interests are so
vast that, as Buffett writes: “when you are looking at Berkshire, you are
looking across corporate America.”
Examples: food, clothing, building materials, tools, equipment,
newspapers, books, transportation services and financial products.
Berkshire also owns large equity interests in major corporations—including
American Express, Coca-Cola, International Business Machines (IBM),
and Wells Fargo—along with half the equity of Heinz and a valuable
option to buy a sizeable stake in Bank of America.
Buffett and Berkshire Vice Chairman Charlie Munger built this
sprawling enterprise by investing in businesses with excellent economic
characteristics and run by outstanding managers. While they prefer
negotiated acquisitions of 100% of such a business at a fair price, they take
a “double-barreled approach” of buying on the open market less than 100%
of some businesses when they can do so at a pro-rata price well below what
it would take to buy 100%.
The double-barreled approach pays off handsomely. The value of
marketable securities in Berkshire's portfolio, on a per share basis,
increased from $4 in 1965 to more than $140,000 by 2015, a 19%
compound annual gain. Per share operating earnings increased in the same
period from just over $4 to nearly $11,000, a compound annual gain of
about 20.6%. According to Buffett, these results follow not from any
master plan but from focused investing—allocating capital by
concentrating on businesses with outstanding economic characteristics and
run by first-rate managers.
Buffett views Berkshire as a partnership among him, Munger and other
shareholders, and virtually all his net worth is in Berkshire stock. His
economic goal is long-term—to maximize Berkshire's per share intrinsic
value by owning all or part of a diversified group of businesses that
generate cash and above-average returns. In achieving this goal, Buffett
foregoes expansion for the sake of expansion and foregoes divestment of
businesses so long as they generate some cash and have good management.
Berkshire retains and reinvests earnings when doing so delivers at least
proportional increases in per share market value over time. It uses debt
sparingly and sells equity only when it receives as much in value as it
gives. Buffett penetrates accounting conventions, especially those that
obscure real economic earnings.
These owner-related business principles, as Buffett calls them, are the
organizing themes of the accompanying essays. As organized, the essays
constitute an elegant and instructive manual on management, investment,
finance, and accounting. Buffett's basic principles form the framework for a
rich range of positions on the wide variety of issues that exist in all aspects
of business. They go far beyond mere abstract platitudes. It is true that
investors should focus on fundamentals, be patient, and exercise good
judgment based on common sense. In Buffett's essays, these advisory
tidbits are anchored in the more concrete principles by which Buffett lives
and thrives.
C G
For Buffett, managers are stewards of shareholder capital. The best
managers think like owners in making business decisions. They have
shareholder interests at heart. But even first-rate managers will sometimes
have interests that conflict with those of shareholders. How to ease those
conflicts and to nurture managerial stewardship have been constant
objectives of Buffett's long career and a prominent theme of his essays. The
essays address some of the most important governance problems.
The first is the importance of forthrightness and candor in
communications by managers to shareholders. Buffett tells it like it is, or at
least as he sees it, and laments that he is in the minority. Berkshire's annual
report is not glossy; Buffett prepares its contents using words and numbers
people of average intelligence can understand; and all investors get the
same information at the same time. Buffett and Berkshire avoid making
predictions, a bad managerial habit that too often leads other managers to
fudge their financial reports.
Besides the owner-orientation reflected in Buffett's disclosure practice
and the owner-related business principles summarized above, the next
management lesson is to dispense with formulas of managerial structure.
Contrary to textbook rules on organizational behavior, mapping an abstract
chain of command on to a particular business situation, according to
Buffett, does little good. What matters is selecting people who are able,
honest, and diligent. Having first-rate people on the team is more important
than designing hierarchies and clarifying who reports to whom about what
and at what times.
Special attention must be paid to selecting a chief executive officer
(CEO) because of three major differences Buffett identifies between CEOs
and other employees. First, standards for measuring a CEO's performance
are inadequate or easy to manipulate, so a CEO's performance is harder to
measure than that of most workers. Second, no one is senior to the CEO, so
no senior person's performance can be measured either. Third, a board of
directors cannot serve that senior role since relations between CEOs and
boards are conventionally congenial.
Major reforms are often directed toward aligning management and
shareholder interests or enhancing board oversight of CEO performance.
Stock options for management were touted as one method; greater
emphasis on board processes was another. Separating the identities and
functions of the Chairman of the Board and the CEO or appointment of
standing audit, nominating and compensation committees were also
heralded as promising reforms. Perhaps the most pervasive prescription is
to populate boards with independent directors. None of these innovations
has solved governance problems, however, and some have exacerbated
them.
The best solution, Buffett instructs, is to take great care in identifying
CEOs who will perform capably regardless of weak structural restraints. In
public companies, large institutional shareholders must exercise their
power to oust CEOs that do not measure up to the demands of corporate
stewardship. Outstanding CEOs do not need a lot of coaching from owners,
although they can benefit from having a similarly outstanding board.
Directors therefore must be chosen for their business savvy, their interest,
and their owner-orientation. According to Buffett, one of the greatest
problems among boards in corporate America is that members are selected
for other reasons, such as adding diversity or prominence to a board—or,
famously, independence.
Most reforms are painted with a broad brush, without noting the major
differences among types of board situations that Buffett identifies. For
example, director power is weakest in the case where there is a controlling
shareholder who is also the manager. When disagreements arise between
the directors and management, there is little a director can do other than to
object and, in serious circumstances, resign. Director power is strongest at
the other extreme, where there is a controlling shareholder who does not
participate in management. The directors can take matters directly to the
controlling shareholder when disagreement arises.
The most common situation, however, is a corporation without a
controlling shareholder. This is where management problems are most
acute, Buffett says. It would be helpful if directors could supply necessary
discipline, but board congeniality usually prevents that. To maximize board
effectiveness in this situation, Buffett believes the board should be small in
size and composed mostly of outside directors. The strongest weapon a
director can wield in these situations remains the threat to resign.
All these situations do share a common characteristic: the terrible
manager is a lot easier to confront or remove than the mediocre manager. A
chief problem in traditional governance structures was that in corporate
America evaluation of chief executive officers was never conducted in
regular meetings in the absence of that chief executive. Holding regular
meetings without the chief executive to review his or her performance can
produce a marked improvement in corporate governance.
The CEOs at Berkshire's various operating companies enjoy a unique
position in corporate America. They are given a simple set of commands:
to run their business as if (1) they are its sole owner, (2) it is the only asset
they hold, and (3) they can never sell or merge it for fifty years. This
enables Berkshire CEOs to manage with a long-term horizon ahead of
them, something alien to the CEOs of public companies whose short-term
oriented shareholders obsess with meeting the latest quarterly earnings
estimate. Short-term results matter, of course, but the Berkshire approach
avoids any pressure to achieve them at the expense of strengthening longterm competitive advantages.
If only short-term results mattered, many managerial decisions would be
much easier, particularly those relating to businesses whose economic
characteristics have eroded. Consider the time horizon trade-off Buffett
faced in managing what he considers the worst investment he ever made,
buying Berkshire in the first place. The economic characteristics of
Berkshire's old textile business had begun to erode by the late 1970s.
Buffett had hoped to devise a reversal of its misfortunes, noting how
important Berkshire's textile business was to its employees and local
communities in New England, and how able and understanding
management and labor had been in addressing the economic difficulties.
Buffett kept the ailing plant alive through 1985, but a financial reversal
could not be achieved and Buffett eventually closed it. This balancing of
short-term results with long-term prospects based on community trust is not
easy, but it is intelligent. Kindred lessons carry over to other sectors in
which Berkshire invests, such as the newspaper business in the internet
age, and highly regulated industries, such as energy and railroads, in which
Buffett sees an implicit social compact between private enterprise and
regulatory overseers.
Sometimes management interests conflict with shareholder interests in
subtle or easily disguised ways. Take corporate philanthropy, for example.
At most major corporations, management allocates a portion of corporate
profit to charitable concerns. The charities are chosen by management, for
reasons often unrelated either to corporate interests or shareholder interests.
Most state laws permit management to make these decisions, so long as
aggregate annual donations are reasonable in amount, usually not greater
than 10% of annual net profits.
Berkshire does things differently. It makes no contributions at the parent
company level and allows its subsidiaries to follow philanthropic policies
they had in effect before Berkshire acquired them. For two decades,
moreover, Berkshire used an imaginative program through which its
shareholders designated the charities to which Berkshire would donate and
in what amounts. Nearly all shareholders participated, donating tens of
millions of dollars annually to thousands of different charities. Political
controversy over the abortion issue, however, interfered with this program.
Political activists organized boycotts of Berkshire's products to protest
particular charitable donations that were made, destroying this feature of
Berkshire's “partnership” approach.
The plan to align management and shareholder interests by awarding
executives stock options not only was oversold, but also subtly disguised a
deeper division between those interests that the options created. Many
corporations pay their managers stock options whose value increases
simply by retention of earnings, rather than by superior deployment of
capital. As Buffett explains, however, simply by retaining and reinvesting
earnings, managers can report annual earnings increases without so much
as lifting a finger to improve real returns on capital. Stock options thus
often rob shareholders of wealth and allocate the booty to executives.
Moreover, once granted, stock options are often irrevocable, unconditional,
and benefit managers without regard to individual performance.
It is possible to use stock options to instill a managerial culture that
encourages owner-like thinking, Buffett agrees. But the alignment will not
be perfect. Shareholders are exposed to the downside risks of sub-optimal
capital deployment in a way that an option holder is not. Buffett therefore
cautions shareholders who are reading proxy statements about approving
option plans to be aware of the asymmetry in this kind of alignment. Many
shareholders rationally ignore proxy statements, but the abuse of stock
options should be on the front-burner of shareholders, particularly
institutional investors that periodically engage in promoting corporate
governance improvements.
Buffett emphasizes that performance should be the basis for executive
pay decisions. Executive performance should be measured by profitability,
after profits are reduced by a charge for the capital employed in the
relevant business or earnings retained by it. If stock options are used, they
should be related to individual performance, rather than corporate
performance, and priced based on business value. Better yet, as at
Berkshire, stock options should simply not be part of an executive's
compensation. After all, exceptional managers who earn cash bonuses
based on the performance of their own business can simply buy stock if
they want to; if they do, they “truly walk in the shoes of owners,” Buffett
says. And owners' interests are paramount on executive pay as with other
corporate governance topics Buffett addresses, such as risk management,
corporate compliance and financial reporting.
Corporate culture is among the most important yet least quantifiable
factors in assessing a business. At Berkshire, culture runs deep. It begins
with the tone at the top set at Omaha headquarters by the norms and values
that animate this collection. Berkshire's culture also permeates the
subsidiaries that call Berkshire home and the managers of the many and
varied business units that comprise Berkshire today. Remarkably for a vast
conglomerate comprised of a sprawling and diverse group of businesses,
Berkshire's culture is uniform and enduring and, Buffett says, will help
Berkshire prosper long after he and Munger leave the scene.
F I
The most revolutionary investing ideas of the past forty years were those
called modern finance theory. This is an elaborate set of ideas that boil
down to one simple and misleading practical implication: it is a waste of
time to study individual investment opportunities in public securities.
According to this view, you will do better by randomly selecting a group of
stocks for a portfolio by throwing darts at the stock tables than by thinking
about whether individual investment opportunities make sense.
One of modern finance theory's main tenets is modern portfolio theory. It
says that you can eliminate the peculiar risk of any security by holding a
diversified portfolio—that is, it formalizes the folk slogan “don't put all
your eggs in one basket.” The risk that is left over is the only risk for which
investors will be compensated, the story goes.
This leftover risk can be measured by a simple mathematical term—
called beta—that shows how volatile the security is compared to the
market. Beta measures this volatility risk well for securities that trade on
efficient markets, where information about publicly traded securities is
swiftly and accurately incorporated into prices. In the modern finance story,
efficient markets rule.
Reverence for these ideas was not limited to ivory tower academics, in
colleges, universities, business schools, and law schools, but became
standard dogma throughout financial America in the past forty years, from
Wall Street to Main Street. Many professionals still believe that stock
market prices always accurately reflect fundamental values, that the only
risk that matters is the volatility of prices, and that the best way to manage
that risk is to invest in a diversified group of stocks.
Being part of a distinguished line of investors stretching back to Graham
and Dodd which debunks standard dogma by logic and experience, Buffett
thinks most markets are not purely efficient and that equating volatility
with risk is a gross distortion. Accordingly, Buffett worried that a whole
generation of MBAs and JDs, under the influence of modern finance
theory, was at risk of learning the wrong lessons and missing the important
ones.
A particularly costly lesson of modern finance theory came from the
proliferation of portfolio insurance—a computerized technique for
readjusting a portfolio in declining markets. The promiscuous use of
portfolio insurance helped precipitate the stock market crash of October
1987, as well as the market break of October 1989. It nevertheless had a
silver lining: it shattered the modern finance story being told in business
and law schools and faithfully being followed by many on Wall Street.
Ensuing market volatility could not be explained by modern finance
theory, nor could mountainous other phenomena relating to the behavior of
small capitalization stocks, high dividend-yield stocks, and stocks with low
price-earnings ratios. The piece de resistance of market inefficiency was
the technology and Internet stock bubble that blew up in the late 1990s and
early 2000s, marked by stock price gyrations that spasmodically bounced
between euphoria and gloom without the remotest nexus to business value.
Growing numbers of skeptics emerged to say that beta does not really
measure the investment risk that matters, and that capital markets are really
not efficient enough to make beta meaningful anyway.
In stirring up the discussion, people started noticing Buffett's record of
successful investing and calling for a return to the Graham-Dodd approach
to investing and business. After all, for more than forty years Buffett has
generated average annual returns of 20% or better, which double the
market average. For more than twenty years before that, Ben Graham's
Graham-Newman Corp. had done the same thing. As Buffett emphasizes,
the stunning performances at Graham-Newman and at Berkshire deserve
respect: the sample sizes were significant; they were conducted over an
extensive time period, and were not skewed by a few fortunate experiences;
no data-mining was involved; and the performances were longitudinal, not
selected by hindsight.
Threatened by Buffett's performance, stubborn devotees of modern
finance theory resorted to strange explanations for his success. Maybe he is
just lucky—the monkey who typed out Hamlet —or maybe he has inside
access to information that other investors do not. In dismissing Buffett,
modern finance enthusiasts still insist that an investor's best strategy is to
diversify based on betas or dart throwing, and constantly reconfigure one's
portfolio of investments.
Buffett responds with a quip and some advice: the quip is that devotees
of his investment philosophy should probably endow chaired
professorships at colleges and universities to ensure the perpetual teaching
of efficient market dogma; the advice is to ignore modern finance theory
and other quasi-sophisticated views of the market and stick to investment
knitting. That can best be done for many people through long-term
investment in an index fund. Or it can be done by conducting hard-headed
analyses of businesses within an investor's competence to evaluate. In that
kind of thinking, the risk that matters is not beta or volatility, but the
possibility of loss or injury from an investment.
Assessing that kind of investment risk requires thinking about a
company's management, products, competitors, and debt levels. The
inquiry is whether after-tax returns on an investment are at least equal to
the purchasing power of the initial investment plus a fair rate of return. The
primary relevant factors are the long-term economic characteristics of a
business, the quality and integrity of its management, and future levels of
taxation and inflation. Maybe these factors are vague, particularly
compared with the seductive precision of beta, but the point is that
judgments about such matters cannot be avoided, except to an investor's
disadvantage.
Buffett points out the absurdity of beta by observing that “a stock that
has dropped very sharply compared to the market . . . becomes ‘riskier’ at
the lower price than it was at the higher price”—that is how beta measures
risk. Equally unhelpful, beta cannot distinguish the risk inherent in “a
single-product toy company selling pet rocks or hula hoops from another
toy company whose sole product is Monopoly or Barbie.” But ordinary
investors can make those distinctions by thinking about consumer behavior
and the way consumer products companies compete, and can also figure
out when a huge stock-price drop signals a buying opportunity.
Contrary to modern finance theory, Buffett's investment knitting does not
prescribe diversification. It may even call for concentration, if not of one's
portfolio, then at least of its owner's mind. As to concentration of the
portfolio, Buffett reminds us that Keynes, who was not only a brilliant
economist but also an astute investor, believed that an investor should put
fairly large sums into two or three businesses he knows something about
and whose management is trustworthy. On that view, risk rises when
investments and investment thinking are spread too thin. A strategy of
financial and mental concentration may reduce risk by raising both the
intensity of an investor's thinking about a business and the comfort level he
must have with its fundamental characteristics before buying it.
The fashion of beta, according to Buffett, suffers from inattention to “a
fundamental principle: It is better to be approximately right than precisely
wrong.” Long-term investment success depends not on studying betas and
maintaining a diversified portfolio, but on recognizing that as an investor,
one is the owner of a business. Reconfiguring a portfolio by buying and
selling stocks to accommodate the desired beta-risk profile defeats longterm investment success. Such “flitting from flower to flower” imposes
huge transaction costs in the forms of spreads, fees and commissions, not to
mention taxes. Buffett jokes that calling someone who trades actively in the
market an investor “is like calling someone who repeatedly engages in onenight stands a romantic.” Investment knitting turns modern finance theory's
folk wisdom on its head: instead of “don't put all your eggs in one basket,”
we get Mark Twain's advice from Pudd'nhead Wilson : “Put all your eggs
in one basket—and watch that basket.”
Buffett learned the art of investing from Ben Graham as a graduate
student at Columbia Business School in the 1950s and later working at
Graham-Newman. In a number of classic works, including The Intelligent
Investor , Graham introduced some of the most profound investment
wisdom in history. It rejects a prevalent but mistaken mind-set that equates
price with value. On the contrary, Graham held that price is what you pay
and value is what you get. These two things are rarely identical, but most
people rarely notice any difference.
One of Graham's most profound contributions is a character who lives on
Wall Street, Mr. Market. He is your hypothetical business partner who is
daily willing to buy your interest in a business or sell you his at prevailing
market prices. Mr. Market is moody, prone to manic swings from joy to
despair. Sometimes he offers prices way higher than value; sometimes he
offers prices way lower than value. The more manic-depressive he is, the
greater the spread between price and value, and therefore the greater the
investment opportunities he offers. Buffett reintroduces Mr. Market,
emphasizing how valuable Graham's allegory of the overall market is for
disciplined investment knitting—even though Mr. Market would be
unrecognizable to modern finance theorists.
Another leading prudential legacy from Graham is his margin-of-safety
principle. This principle holds that one should not make an investment in a
security unless there is a sufficient basis for believing that the price being
paid is substantially lower than the value being delivered. Buffett follows
the principle devotedly, noting that Graham had said that if forced to distill
the secret of sound investment into three words, they would be: margin of
safety. Over forty years after first reading that, Buffett still thinks those are
the right words. While modern finance theory enthusiasts cite market
efficiency to deny there is a difference between price (what you pay) and
value (what you get), Buffett and Graham regard it as all the difference in
the world.
That difference also shows that the term “value investing” is a
redundancy. All true investing must be based on an assessment of the
relationship between price and value. Strategies that do not employ this
comparison of price and value do not amount to investing at all, but to
speculation—the hope that price will rise, rather than the conviction that
the price being paid is lower than the value being obtained. Many
professionals make another common mistake, Buffett notes, by
distinguishing between “growth investing” and “value investing.” Growth
and value, Buffett says, are not distinct. They are integrally linked since
growth must be treated as a component of value.
Nor does the phrase “relational investing” resonate with Buffett. The
term became popular in the mid-1990s, describing a style of investing that
is designed to reduce the costs of the separation of shareholder ownership
from managerial control by emphasizing shareholder involvement and
monitoring of management. Many people incorrectly identified Buffett and
Berkshire as exemplars of this descriptive label. It is true that Buffett buys
big blocks in a few companies and sticks around a long time. He also only
invests in businesses run by people he trusts. But that is about as far as the
similarity goes. If Buffett were pressed to use an adjective to describe his
investment style, it would be something like “focused” or “intelligent”
investing. Yet even these words ring redundant; the unadorned term
investor best describes Buffett.
Other misuses of terms include blurring the difference between
speculation and arbitrage as methods of sound cash management; the latter
being very important for companies like Berkshire that generate substantial
excess cash. Both speculation and arbitrage are ways to use excess cash
rather than hold it in short-term cash equivalents such as commercial paper.
Speculation describes the use of cash to bet on lots of corporate events
based on rumors of unannounced coming transactions. Arbitrage,
traditionally understood to mean exploiting different prices for the same
thing on two different markets, for Buffett describes the use of cash to take
short-term positions in a few opportunities that have been publicly
announced. It exploits different prices for the same thing at different times.
Deciding whether to employ cash this way requires evaluating four
commonsense questions based on information rather than rumor: the
probability of the event occurring, the time the funds will be tied up, the
opportunity cost, and the downside if the event does not occur.
The circle of competence principle is the third leg of the Graham/Buffett
stool of intelligent investing, along with Mr. Market and the margin of
safety. This commonsense rule instructs investors to consider investments
only concerning businesses they are capable of understanding with a
modicum of effort. It is this commitment to stick with what he knows that
enables Buffett to avoid the mistakes others repeatedly make, particularly
those who feast on the fantasies of fast riches promised by technological
fads and new era rhetoric that have recurrently infested speculative markets
over the centuries.
In all investment thinking, one must guard against what Buffett calls the
“institutional imperative.” It is a pervasive force in which institutional
dynamics produce resistance to change, absorption of available corporate
funds, and reflexive approval of sub-optimal CEO strategies by
subordinates. Contrary to what is often taught in business and law schools,
this powerful force often interferes with rational business decision-making.
The ultimate result of the institutional imperative is a follow-the-pack
mentality producing industry imitators, rather than industry leaders—what
Buffett calls a lemming-like approach to business.
Every reader of this collection will savor, and want to share with family
and friends, Buffett's compelling essays on the use of debt. Aptly dubbed
“Life and Debt,” these exquisitely explain both the temptation and perils of
leverage in personal and corporate finance.
I A
All these investment principles are animated in Buffett's lively essays
concerning investment opportunities. After explaining his preference for
investing in productive assets, and defining what this means, a series of
essays addresses a wide range of alternatives, starting with junk and zerocoupon bonds and preferred stock. Challenging both Wall Street and the
academy, Buffett again draws on Graham's ideas to reject the “dagger
thesis” advanced to defend junk bonds. The dagger thesis, using the
metaphor of the intensified care an automobile driver would take facing a
dagger mounted on the steering wheel, overemphasizes the disciplining
effect that enormous amounts of debt in a capital structure exerts on
management.
Buffett points to the large numbers of corporations that failed in the early
1990s recession under crushing debt burdens to dispute academic research
showing that higher interest rates on junk bonds more than compensated
for their higher default rates. He attributes this error to a flawed assumption
recognizable to any first-year statistics student: that historical conditions
prevalent during the study period would be identical in the future. They
would not. Further illuminating the folly of junk bonds is an essay in this
collection by Charlie Munger that discusses Michael Milken's approach to
finance.
Wall Street tends to embrace ideas based on revenue-generating power,
rather than on financial sense, a tendency that often perverts good ideas to
bad ones. In a history of zero-coupon bonds, for example, Buffett shows
that they can enable a purchaser to lock in a compound rate of return equal
to a coupon rate that a normal bond paying periodic interest would not
provide. Using zero-coupons thus for a time enabled a borrower to borrow
more without need of additional free cash flow to pay the interest expense.
Problems arose, however, when zero-coupon bonds started to be issued by
weaker and weaker credits whose free cash flow could not sustain
increasing debt obligations. Buffett laments, “as happens in Wall Street all
too often, what the wise do in the beginning, fools do in the end.”
Many culprits contributed to the financial crisis of 2008, among them the
proliferation of derivative financial instruments, which Buffett's essays
written several years earlier had warned about. Contemporary financial
engineering has produced an explosion of complex instruments known as
derivatives, because their fluctuating value is derived from movements in a
contractually designated benchmark. Proponents believe that these devices
are useful to manage risk—and Berkshire from time to time takes modest
positions in derivatives contracts that Buffett judges as mis-priced. But
while proponents also believe that derivatives tend to reduce overall
systemic risk, Buffett presciently observed that they may have the opposite
effect. They are hard to value, valuations can change rapidly and they
create linkages and interdependencies among financial institutions. Buffett
cautioned that the combination of these factors could mean that, should a
single event cause challenges in one sector, that could spread rapidly to
others with a domino effect bringing devastating systemic consequences.
Such was the case with the crisis of 2008.
Buffett acknowledges that his view on derivative risks may be
influenced by his aversion to any kind of mega-catastrophe risk that would
jeopardize Berkshire's status as a fortress of financial strength. But this is
no arm-chair opinion, for Buffett endured several years of direct experience
in managing a derivatives dealership that came along with Berkshire's
acquisition of the Gen Re reinsurance company. Buffett explains the
unpleasant consequences of not dumping the business immediately but
notes how it could not be sold and contained a maze of long term liabilities
that took several painful years to unwind. Buffett offers extensive
meditation on this experience so that others can learn from the Berkshire
trials
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